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a b s t r a c t
The current study explored causal language in 3.5- to 4-year-old children by manipulating
the type of agent (human acting intentionally or unintentionally, or inanimate object) and
the type of effect (motion or state change) in causal events. Experiment 1 found that the
type of agent, but not the type of effect, inﬂuenced children’s production of causal language. Children produced more causal language for intentionally caused events than for
either unintentionally- or object-caused events, independent of the type of effect. Experiment 2, which tested children’s judgments of descriptions for the events, found a similar
pattern. Children preferred causal descriptions more for the intentionally caused events
than the unintentionally- and the object-caused events. Experiment 3 found no evidence
of bias in children’s non-linguistic representations of the events. Taken together, these
results suggest an intention-to-CAUSE bias in children’s mapping of conceptual representations of causality into linguistic structure. We discuss the implications of these results for
the acquisition of causal language and for the development of conceptual representations
of causality.
Ó 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction
Human adults have the remarkable ability to represent
the causal structure of a seemingly inﬁnite set of events.
Adults can reason about the effects of their own actions
and about the effects of other people’s actions. Furthermore, when making causal judgments, the intention of
the agent is of no consequence – regardless of whether a
person intentionally turned off the television or unintentionally sat down on a remote control, adults will still judge
that the person caused the television to turn off. Additionally, causal reasoning is not restricted to judgments about
human agents – adults are equally capable of causally reasoning about the effects of both animate and inanimate objects – and adults can causally reason about many types of
effects, such as object motion, lights turning off, balloons
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popping, or plant growth. Thus, causal representations extend to a wide range of events – events that crosscut conceptual classes.
The breadth and apparent intricacy of causal reasoning
in adults poses a fundamental question concerning the
developmental origin of this vast capacity in human cognition. Are human infants and young children able to reason
causally about a wide variety of events (Gopnik et al.,
2004)? Or, is causal reasoning initially biased towards a
certain class of events, such as events of motion (Michotte,
1963) or events involving animate agents acting intentionally (Piaget, 1954)? If early causal representations emerge
from a restricted class of events, then biases may not only
emerge in the way young infants represent causal events,
they may also emerge in the way older children use causal
language, since linguistic representations interact with
non-linguistic representations early in development (e.g.,
Bloom, 1973; Clark, 2004; Landau, Smith, & Jones, 1988;
Mandler, 1992; Slobin, 1973, 1985). Speciﬁcally, children
may show a bias to map a certain class of events (e.g.,
motion events, intentional events) more often into causal
linguistic structures than other classes of events.
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The question of whether factors such as the animacy
and intentionality in an event inﬂuence children’s causal
language is motivated not only from developmental theories regarding the origin and nature of conceptual representations of causality (Piaget, 1954; White, 1995, 1999),
but also from research exploring causal language in adults
(Wolff, 2003; see also Song & Wolff, 2005). Such research
suggests that while adults use causal language to describe
a wide range of causal events, the animacy and intentionality of the agent inﬂuences the speciﬁc type of causal language adults use to describe causal events. Given the
signiﬁcance of these factors in theorizing about the
ontogeny of causal representations, as well as in adults’
causal language, the current study explores whether and
how these conceptual factors play a role in children’s
linguistic encoding of causal events.
1.1. Conceptual representations of cause
Two prominent theories of the development of causal
representations provide insights into the types of biases
that may emerge in children’s developing causal language.
According to both theories, although later in development
causal representations can be applied to all events, early in
development a more limited class of events serves as the
prototypical schema for causality. The theories differ, however, in which class of events serves as the basis for causal
representations. According to one theory, mature causal
representations emerge from representations of human actions causing speciﬁc effects in the world. Although this
idea is closely associated with the ideas of Piaget (1954),
its main tenets are also found in philosophy (Maine di
Biran, see Michotte (1963)), and more recently in the work
of White (1995, 1999). Piaget believed that the child was
initially born without any representations of causality.
Then, over the ﬁrst 6 months of life, the infant begins to
construct causal representations that are initially limited
to his or her own actions. Over development infants’ concept of causal action broadens to include other people’s intended and unintended actions, and eventually children
include objects and other nonhuman agents, such as the
weather, as causal agents.
In contrast, Michotte (1963) emphasized the importance of the type of effect, rather than the type of agent,
in representations of causality. According to Michotte, the
initial causal event is a caused motion event. Through
extensive psychophysical experiments exploring adult
causal perception, he showed that the ability to perceive
one object as causing an effect in another object is (1)
inﬂuenced only by the spatiotemporal parameters of the
event (spatial contact, temporal continuity) and (2) limited
to events in which the second object was caused to move
(rather than, for example, change color). Michotte indeed
acknowledged that adults can readily represent nonmotion, change of state events (hereafter called ‘‘state change
events’’) as causal. To account for this ability, Michotte proposed that adults’ causal representations of state change
events are generalizations from an initially domainspeciﬁc module dedicated to causal perception of motion
events (for a more complete review of both theories, see
Muentener & Carey, 2010).

Thus, these two theories make very different claims
about the origin of causal representations – one emphasizing events involving intentional agents and one emphasizing motion events. In the current paper, we explore how
early conceptual representations of causality may inﬂuence
conceptual and linguistic representations of causality later
in development. Our working linking hypothesis is that if
causal reasoning is restricted early in development, then later in development, even if causal reasoning becomes unrestricted, biases may remain in children’s construal of causal
events. If in infancy causal representations are restricted to
events involving intentional agents, then later in development when children view a causal event, they may be more
likely to encode the event as causal if it is caused by an
intentional agent than if it is caused by a nonintentional
agent. This conceptual bias may, in turn, increase the likelihood that causal events involving agents acting intentionally are mapped into causal linguistic structures.
However, if in infancy causal representations are restricted
to events involving caused motion, then, later in development, children may be more likely to encode an event as
causal if it is a motion event than if it is a state change event,
which may, in turn, increase the likelihood that causal motion events are mapped into causal linguistic structures.
The current study aims to bring evidence to bear on these
alternatives, and to shed light on children’s use of causal
language and the mapping of children’s conceptual representations into causal linguistic structures. If any differences emerge in children’s causal language, this may also
provide some insights into the possible origins for conceptual representations of causality.
1.2. Linguistic representation of CAUSE
The unitary causal nature of different types of events
(caused motion, caused state change, intentionally caused,
unintentionally caused, object-caused, etc.) is captured by
linguistic theory, which posits that there is a primitive
CAUSE that deﬁnes the semantic structure of all causal
events (Jackendoff, 1983, 1990, 2002; Levin & RappaportHovav, 1995, 2005; Pinker, 1989). For example, consider a
motion event of a golf ball rolling as a result of (1) a boy
intentionally moving the ball with a putter, (2) a boy accidentally moving a golf ball by unintentionally hitting the
ball with the putter, or (3) a green ball rolling into a red ball,
which then contacts the golf ball, making it move. Amongst
many other alternatives, we can describe all these events
with causal language, such as (1) ‘‘the boy moved the ball,’’
(2) ‘‘the boy accidentally moved the ball’’/‘‘the boy made the
ball move‘‘, and (3) ‘‘The green ball moved the golf ball’’/
‘‘The green ball made the golf ball move’’. Furthermore,
CAUSE is not restricted to motion events, but extends also
to change of state events. Consider an event in which the
boy turns on a light, rather than moves a ball. We can describe this event as ‘‘the boy turned on the light,’’ an event
that carries the same notion of causality as motion events.
The ﬁrst step in encoding any of the above causal events
in language is choosing a verb, and the choice of verb constrains the syntactic encoding of the event components
(Gleitman, 1990, 1965; Jackendoff, 1990; Landau &
Gleitman, 1985; Levin & Rappaport-Hovav, 1995, 2005).
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Some verbs include both the cause and effect in their semantic structure (we refer to these as ‘causal’ verbs) and some
verbs include only the causal agent or the affected patient
in their semantic structure (we refer to these as ‘non-causal
verbs’). Causal verbs, such as ‘‘break’’ and ‘‘roll,’’ include
both the cause and effect in their semantic structure, and
these components can map into syntax in various ways.
First, both the cause and effect may be mapped into syntactic structure in single clause descriptions. In the description,
‘‘the boy moved the ball’’, the causal agent (the boy) is
mapped into the subject noun phrase, while the effect (moving ball) is mapped into the verb phrase (verb + direct object). This linguistic structure is referred to as the lexical
causative construction. Another possibility is that only the
effect may be mapped into syntactic structure, as in the
example, ‘‘The ball moved.’’ This linguistic structure is referred to as the inchoative construction. Verbs such as
‘break’ also participate in multi-clause descriptions, such
as the periphrastic causative construction (‘‘the boy made
the ball move’’) in which the causal agent (the boy) is
mapped into the subject noun phrase, while the effect (moving ball) is mapped into an embedded clause. These various
descriptions all involving the verb ‘move’ illustrate that
although the verb ‘move’ carries a causal meaning in its
semantic structure, it participates in a variety of syntactic
constructions that either include both the cause and effect
(lexical or periphrastic causative) or only the effect (inchoative) (Jackendoff, 1990, 2002; Levin & Rappaport-Hovav,
1995, 2005). We refer to syntactic structures that encode
both the cause and effect (lexical and periphrastic) as causal
syntactic frames, while the inchoative – a syntactic structure that encodes only the effect – is one of several noncausal syntactic frames.
It is not necessary that causal events be encoded with
verbs that include both the cause and/or effect in their
semantic structures – speakers have a variety of options.
If a speaker is describing an event in which a girl breaks
a tower of blocks with a stick, the speaker may describe
this event as ‘‘the girl hit the tower (with the stick)’’ – a
transitive sentence which encodes only the causal agent
and its action (i.e., the cause and not the effect) – or ‘‘the
tower fell’’ – an intransitive which encodes only the affected patient (i.e., the effect and not the cause). When
verbs such as ‘‘fall,’’ however, are used in the periphrastic
causative construction, both the cause and the effect are
encoded (‘‘she made the tower fall’’). It is also possible to
imply both the cause and effect by conjoining two phrases,
such as ‘‘the girl hit the tower and the tower fell,’’ a structure we refer to as the conjunction. Finally, speakers are
not obligated to describe any part of the causal event. They
can describe something about the event other than the
cause and effect, such as ‘‘the girl wore a blue shirt.’’
Thus far, our discussion of causal language has focused on
events that are mediated causal events – events where a causal agent uses an intermediary object to cause an effect (e.g.,
a boy moving the ball with a putter). In the current study, we
focus exclusively on mediated causal events since it is these
events in which the intentionality of the agent has been
shown to inﬂuence the nature of causal language in adults
(Song & Wolff, 2005; Wolff, 2003). Generally, lexical causative structures (‘‘he broke the window’’) seem to map onto
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only certain types of events, one type of event being mediated events that are intentionally caused, rather than mediated events that are unintentionally caused. This was
demonstrated in a study by Wolff (2003) in which adults
were presented with direct and mediated causal events that
portrayed one of three agents (human acting intentionally, a
human acting unintentionally, or inanimate object) causing
an effect. In the mediated causal events a person or an inanimate object acted on an intermediary object to cause an effect (e.g., a person/green marble acted on a blue marble that
caused a red marble to move); these events included both
motion and state changes. The intentions of the human agent
varied; in some events the person intentionally caused the
effect to occur (a woman pressed a button on a remote which
caused the tv to turn off) or unintentionally caused the effect
to occur (a woman accidentally sat on a remote which
caused the tv to turn off). After viewing each event, adults
were asked to choose between a lexical causative description
(e.g., ‘‘the man/blue marble moved the red marble’’) and a
periphrastic causative description (e.g., ‘‘the man/blue marble made the red marble move’’), or to choose neither. Adults
preferred lexical causatives to describe the mediated events
in which a human acted intentionally, and preferred periphrastic causatives to describe the mediated events in which
the causal agent was a human acting unintentionally or an
inanimate object. Song and Wolff (2005) replicated this pattern of results in a production task. Adults produced more
lexical causative structures to describe intentionally caused
events than to describe unintentionally caused events and
produced more periphrastic and conjunction causative
structures to describe unintentionally caused events.
Experiment 1 explores whether 3.5- to 4-year-old children’s linguistic descriptions also follow this pattern; i.e.,
will children prefer lexical causatives to describe events
(motion and state changes) that are intentionally caused,
and will they use other causal constructions (e.g., the periphrastic and/or conjunction) to describe non-intentionally
caused events? Or, will children exhibit a bias in their use
of causal language towards intentionally caused and/or
motion events, as may be predicted if conceptual representations of causality are restricted to certain classes of events
earlier in development (Michotte, 1963; Piaget, 1954)?
1.3. Children’s causal language
Studies of the development of causal language have explored both children’s comprehension and production of
causal events. In the domain of comprehension, studies
have found that young children are able to associate novel
verbs with causal events and are quite adept at using the
syntactic structure of a sentence to guide the mapping of
an event into a linguistic structure (e.g., Ammon, 1980;
Behrend, 1990; Bunger, 2008; Casasola & Cohen, 2000;
Fisher, 1996, 2002; Gentner, 1978; Naigles, 1990; Wolff,
2003).1 For example, Casasola and Cohen (2000) reported
1
All of these studies explored children’s representations of causal events
involving intentional agents. In Casasola and Cohen (2000) the causal agent
was a car; however it had an animate looking driver. It remains an open
question whether children would show similar abilities if the agent in these
events unintentionally caused the effect.
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that 18-month-olds are able to associate novel verbs presented in isolation (‘‘neem’’) with causal actions (e.g., pushing), and Naigles (1990) found that 2-year-olds are able to
correctly map a transitive sentence (e.g., ‘‘the duck is kradding the rabbit’’) onto an event portraying a causal action
(the duck pushing the rabbit down into a squatting position)
and an intransitive sentence (e.g., ‘‘the duck and the rabbit
are kradding’’) onto a non-causal event (the duck and the
rabbit waving their arm around). Further, a recent study
by Bunger (2008) has shown that 2-year-olds represent a
causal event’s sub-events, such as the action and the result,
and map these sub-events into the corresponding appropriate syntactic constructions (unaccusative intransitive
frames, such as ‘‘the ﬂower is blicking,’’ unergative intransitive frames, such as ‘‘the boy is blicking,’’ and transitive
frames, such as ‘‘the boy is blicking the ﬂower’’).
In the domain of production, studies have shown that
children talk about causal events as early as 2 years of
age, although the majority of their language focuses on social events involving people (Bloom & Capatides, 1987;
Bowerman, 1982; Callanan & Oakes, 1992; Hickling &
Wellman, 2001; Hood & Bloom, 1979). For example, in a
classic study exploring early causal language, Hood
(1979) found that 2- and 3-year-old children predominately talked about events involving causal interactions
between the child and the parent (e.g., the child requests
the parent to open a toy purse) and did not talk about causal events involving physical interactions between two objects (e.g., one object causing another object to move).
More recent studies, however, report that children do talk
about events involving physical causal interactions involving a person acting upon an object (e.g., a person pushing a
cup off of a table), although they still rarely talk about causal interactions solely between two objects (e.g., a ball
knocking a cup off of a table) (Bloom & Capatides, 1987;
Callanan & Oakes, 1992; Hickling & Wellman, 2001).
Research has also shown that young children have a full
command of the different types of syntactic structures that
are used by adults to encode causal events. Bowerman
(1982), in a diary study, reported that her two children
produced lexical and periphrastic causative linguistic
structures by age 2, and that these structures came online
at approximately the same time. A further inspection of the
examples noted in her paper reveals that most of these
constructions were used in the context of two interacting
people or a person interacting with an object. Pinker
(1989) reported that 3.5-year-old children, similar to
Wolff’s (2003) study with adults, use lexical causative constructions to describe direct causal events, such as one animal causing another animal to bend over via direct contact,
and use periphrastic causative structures to describe indirect mediated causal events, such as one animal causing
another animal to bend over by throwing a ball at the second animal. These ﬁndings suggest that, similar to adults,
children use different causal linguistic structures for direct
causal events and for mediated causal events, at least for
events that have animate, intentional agents.
In sum, these studies show that children overwhelmingly use causal language to describe events in which people are intentionally causing changes in the world. There
are at least two possible explanations for these results:

(1) children may simply be most interested in, and talk
mostly about, causal events involving intentional agents
even though they have the ability to talk about any type
of event as causal, or (2) there may be biases either in children’s conceptual representations of cause or in the mappings of these representations into language. If causal
representations are biased towards events involving intentional agents, then these events may be encoded as causal
more frequently, and thus more likely to be mapped into
causal language. Findings reported by Wolff (1999) support the latter possibility. Wolff (1999) found that that
the animacy of the agent inﬂuences 4-year-old children’s,
but not 3-year-olds’, interpretations of lexical causative
descriptions. Children were more likely to map lexical
causative syntactic frames onto mediated causal motion
events than direct causal motion events when the agent
was an animate human hand than when it was a typically
inanimate object. The current studies will shed further
light on children’s early causal representations by focusing
speciﬁcally on children’s representations of mediated causal events and exploring whether and how the intentionality of the causer inﬂuences causal language in an elicited
production task.
1.4. Current study
The aim of the current study is to investigate whether
3.5- to 4-year-old children show biases in the way they
map causal events into causal language. Speciﬁcally, we
ask whether (1) children show a bias to map causal events
involving animate agents acting intentionally into causal
language, and (2) children show a bias to map causal motion events into causal language. If intentional and/or
motion events are privileged in children’s initial representations of cause (Michotte, 1963; Piaget, 1954), then one
(or both) of these predictions may be supported. Experiment 1 explores these questions with an elicited language
production task. We present children with mediated causal
events that vary in the type of agent (human acting intentionally, human acting unintentionally, inanimate object)
and the type of effect (motion, state change). We focus
exclusively on mediated causal events, since the animacy
and intentionality of the agent has only been shown to
inﬂuence adults’ causal language for mediated events
(Song & Wolff, 2005; Wolff, 2003). If children have a bias
to map causal events involving animate agents acting
intentionally into causal language, then they should be
more likely to use causal language to describe intentionally
caused events than to describe unintentionally- or objectcaused events. If children have a bias to map caused motion events into causal language, then they should be more
likely to use causal language to describe caused motion
events than to describe caused state change events. If both
biases are operating, then children should be more likely to
use causal language to describe motion events caused by
intentional agents than to describe state change events
caused by unintentional agents or objects. Finally, if 3.5year-old children already display the typical pattern of
descriptions as that of adults (Song & Wolff, 2005; Wolff,
2003), then they should map all causal events into causal
linguistic structures; speciﬁcally, they should be more
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Table 1
Descriptions of videotaped events used in Experiment.
Event

Effect
type

Agent’s intended action

Agent’s unintended action

Object’s action

Effect

Ball

Motion

Boy reaches behind and lifts shirt (ball on
shirt; boy does not see the ball)

Baseball ball hits red ball,
which rolls into beach ball

Beach ball rolls

Cup

Motion
Motion

Girl twirls spoon while not looking at
cup; spoon hits the cup
Boy trips and turns over cup

Ball ﬂies in, hits bottle,
battle rolls into cup
Books fall over, hit cup,
cup falls over

Cup falls off table

Food

Boy lifts shirt in front of him
(ball on shirt; boy sees the
ball)
Girl looks at cup and hits cup
with spoon
Boy turns over cup

Train

Motion

Girl presses button

Girl leans against button

Balloon

State
change
State
change
State
change
State
change

Girl looks at balloon and
touches balloon with pen
Girl throws block at block
tower
Girl ﬂips light switch

Girl stretches her arms (does not look at
balloon); pen makes contact with balloon
Girl drops block on tower

Boy pushes button on remote
control

Boy sits on remote control

Ball ﬂies in and hits
button
Ball ﬂies in and hits cup,
cup falls on balloon
Ball ﬂies in, hits bottle,
bottle falls on block tower
Ball ﬂies in, hits light
switch
Ball ﬂies in, hits remote
control

Block
Lamp
Television

Girl leans on light switch

likely to map intentionally caused events into lexical causatives and more likely to map unintentionally caused and
object-caused events into periphrastic and conjunction
causative structures.

2. Experiment 1
2.1. Participants
Sixteen 3.5- to 4-year-old children (M = 45 months
11 days, range = 43 months, 12 days to 47 months,
20 days) participated in Experiment 1 (12 females). Participants were excluded if they used the same verb over 33%
of the time, suggesting that they might have been perseverating on verb choice. One additional participant was
excluded for this reason.

2.2. Stimuli
Participants viewed 32 videotaped events on a laptop
computer. The events, modeled after Wolff (2003), were
comprised of an agent (human or object) acting on a mediator (object), which caused a speciﬁc effect to occur – thus
the events were causal events. The events varied on
whether the agent was animate (n = 16) or inanimate
(n = 8), whether the effect was intended (n = 8) or unintended (n = 8), and whether the effects were changes in
motion (n = 16) or changes in state (n = 16) (see Table 1;
for a complete description of the events, also see Appendix
A). Eight ‘ﬁller’ events were also included in which a human actor performed an action that did not produce an effect (e.g., waving, clapping, transferring objects). All the
events were 3- to 5-s long. The 32 events were randomized into two different orders of presentations and the
events were presented in two blocks such that each block
contained 16 events: 4 intended (two motion, two state
change), four unintended (two motion, two state change),
four object (two motion, two state change), and four

Food falls out of
cup into garbage
can
Toy train moves
around track
Balloon pops
Block tower
breaks
Lamp turns off
TV turns off

ﬁllers. The order of the presentation of the blocks was
counterbalanced.
2.3. Procedure
Participants were told that they would see a short video
on a laptop screen. After each video ended and the screen
went black, the participant was instructed to tell the
experimenter ‘‘what happened.’’ Prior to the test events,
participants received training where they viewed four videos that were different from the test set. If children gave
only a single-word description (‘‘bat’’ for an event of a
boy giving a bat to a girl), they were prompted to provide
a more complete description (‘‘what else happened?’’).
Upon completion of the four training events, the participants viewed and described the 32 test events. The experimenter did not ask the child ‘‘what happened’’ during the
test events. Most children spontaneously provided
descriptions. If a child did not spontaneously provide a
description, the experimenter pointed to the participant
to indicate it was his or her turn to speak.
2.4. Coding
The verbal descriptions for each participant were transcribed and coded for the type of verb and the type of syntactic frame. This coding schema below yielded codings for
93.6% of the children’s elicited productions. The remaining
6.4% of elicited productions were excluded either because
they were inaudible (1.7%), because they were not true
descriptions of the event (2.2%), or because they were only
single-word descriptions (2.5%).
We coded for three types of verbs: causal verbs, noncausal effect verbs, and non-causal other verbs. Causal
verbs were deﬁned as verbs that participate in the causal
alternation (‘‘The girl broke the tower’’/‘‘The tower broke’’).
These verbs directly encoded the causal action and effect of
a given event (see Introduction). Non-causal effect verbs
were deﬁned as verbs that described the effect, but did
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Fig. 1. Percentage of productions children’s verb choice (Panel A: causal verbs, e.g., ‘‘break’’; Panel B: non-causal effect verbs, e.g., ‘‘fall’’; Panel C: non-causal
other verbs, e.g., ‘‘hit’’) as a function of the type of agent (intended, unintended, object) and the type of effect (motion, state change). Error bars depict ±1 SE
of the mean.

not participate in the causal alternation (‘‘The tower fell’’).
These verbs always described the effect in a given event,
but did not explicitly mark the agent or the action that
caused the given effect. Non-causal other verbs were deﬁned as verbs that either described the action of the agent
in the event, but did not describe the effect (‘‘The girl hit
the block’’), or verbs that described something true of the
event, but outside the causal structure of the event (‘‘The
girl walked by the tower’’). This classiﬁcation accounted
for 100% of children’s coded descriptions.
We coded four types of syntactic frames: lexical causatives, (e.g., ‘‘the girl broke the tower’’), periphrastic causatives in which the effect is encoded in an embedded
clause (‘‘the girl made the tower break’’), conjunctions in
which one verb encodes the action and another verb encodes the effect (e.g., ‘‘she hit the tower and the tower
fell’’), and non-causal intransitive structures (‘‘the tower
fell’’).2 These four syntactic frames accounted for 100% of
the coded descriptions. Lexical causatives, periphrastic causatives, and conjunctions were coded as causal syntactic
frames, since both the cause and effect is mapped into the
syntax; intransitives were coded as non-causal since only
the effect is mapped into the syntax.
A second coder scored all of the utterances for half of
the sample (n = 8 children) for reliability purposes. The
two coders agreed on 94% of the utterances; any differences were discussed until an agreement was reached.

2
After inspection of children’s descriptions, we included the conjunctive
causative, in addition to the standard causal syntactic frames (lexical
causatives, periphrastic causatives). Both causal and non-causal effect verbs
can be mapped into these structures, ‘‘the man hit the ball and the window
broke/tower fell,’’ such that the entire phrase carries a causal meaning,
although neither phrase alone encodes both the causal agent and the causal
effect. Including these structures also allowed for a more conservative test
of our hypothesis – that children would show biases in the likelihood to use
causal language. By including this additional ‘causal’ structure, we therefore decreased the likelihood we would ﬁnd a difference as a function of the
type of agent (intended, unintended, object) or the type of effect (motion,
state change).

2.5. Results
2.5.1. Causal verbs
Fig. 1 (Panel A) displays the percentage of causal verbs
(‘‘break’’) as a function of agent type (intended, unintended,
and object) and effect type (motion or state change). To assess the inﬂuence of agent type and effect type on children’s
choice of causal verbs, a 3 (Agent type)  2 (Effect type)
within-subjects ANOVA was conducted on the percentage
of causal verbs. This yielded a signiﬁcant main effect of
agent type, F(2, 30) = 11.58, p < .001. Planned analyses,
using Tukey’s HSD with p set at .05, revealed that children
used signiﬁcantly more causal verbs for intended events
(M = 76.0%) then either unintended (M = 54.9%) or object
(M = 48.7%) events (p < .05). Children’s use of causal verbs
did not differ between unintended and object events. Second, the analysis revealed no main effect of effect type,
F(1, 15) < 1, and no interaction between the two factors,
F(2, 30) = 2.814, p > .05. Children were equally likely to
choose a causal verb for motion effects (M = 60.6%) and
for state change effects (M = 59.2%). Since the analyses revealed no main effect of effect type (motion vs. state
change) in the verb choice analysis, subsequent analyses
collapsed across effect type. Further inspection of the data
revealed that this pattern of results was not driven by a
subset of the children using causal verbs to describe all
the events and a subset of the children using causal verbs
to describe only the intended events (i.e., a bimodal distribution). All children used causal verbs to describe some of
the videos of each event type; however, 12 of the 16 children used more causal verbs to describe the intended
events than to describe the unintended and object events.
When children chose a causal verb to describe causal
events, they were not obligated to map both the cause
and effect into causal syntactic frames. Children could have
described an intended event using a causal verb in the lexical causative or periphrastic causative frames (‘‘the girl
broke the tower’’/‘‘the girl made the tower break’’), in the
non-causal inchoative frame, which encodes only the effect
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in the syntax (‘‘the tower broke’’), or in a conjunction frame
(‘‘the girl dropped the block and the tower broke’’). Inspection of the causal descriptions revealed that when children
used causal verbs they primarily used causal linguistic
frames (i.e., lexical, periphrastic, conjunction); intended:
M = 77.3%; unintended: M = 64.8%; object: M = 70.4%) over
inchoative. However, as shown in Fig. 2, children were
more likely to map causal verbs into lexical causal frames
for the intended events (M = 68.4%) than the unintended
(M = 53.2%) or object (M = 47.9%) events. This pattern was
conﬁrmed by a one-way ANOVA on the percentage of causal verbs mapped into lexical frames with agent type as a
within-subject factor, which revealed a main effect of
agent, F(2, 30) = 3.312, p = .05. Planned analyses on the
main effect of agent, using Tukey’s HSD with p set at .05,
revealed that children were more likely to map causal
verbs into lexical frames for the intended events than
either the unintended or object events, which did not differ
from each other. Also, as can be seen in Fig. 2, children seldom mapped causal verbs into the periphrastic or conjunction frames. To assess the inﬂuence of agent type on
children’s mapping into the periphrastic and conjunction
syntactic frames, we conducted two separate one-way
ANOVAs on each causal frame (periphrastic and conjunction) with agent type as the within-subjects factor. These
analyses revealed no signiﬁcant main effects of agent type
for either syntactic frame (periphrastic frame: F(2, 30) < 1;
conjunction frame: F(2, 30) < 1).
In sum, children used more causal verbs to describe the
intended events than the unintended or the object events.
In addition, when children used causal verbs to describe
any of the events (intended, unintended, object, motion,
state change) they used lexical causative frames more for
the intended events than the unintended or the object
events.
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type on children’s choice of non-causal, effect verbs, a 3
(Agent type)  2 (Effect type) within-subjects ANOVA
was conducted on the percentage of non-causal effect
verbs chosen; this yielded a signiﬁcant main effect of agent
type, F(2, 30) = 7.538, p < .01. Planned analyses, using
Tukey’s HSD with p set at .05, revealed that children chose
more non-causal effect verbs for the object events
(M = 21.4%) than either the intended (M = 10.9%) or unintended events (M = 10.9%) (p < .05). There was no main effect of effect type, F(1, 15) < 1, and no interaction between
the two factors, F(2, 30) < 1. Therefore, subsequent analysis
collapsed across effect type.
Similar to when they chose causal verbs, when children
chose non-causal effect verbs (‘‘fall’’), they were not obligated to map these verbs into non-causal frames. Children
could have described these events with a non-causal syntactic frame (‘‘the tower fell’’) or with a causal syntactic
frame, by mapping the verb into the periphrastic frame
(‘‘she made the tower fall’’) or the conjunction frame
(‘‘she dropped the block and the tower fell’’). Although
children also could have (incorrectly) mapped the noncausal verb into the lexical frame (‘‘she fell/falled the
tower’’), children in the current study never did so. Fig. 3
displays the percentage of non-causal verbs mapped into
the causal syntactic frames (periphrastic and conjunction)
as a function of agent type. To assess the inﬂuence of agent
type on children’s mapping into the periphrastic and conjunction syntactic frames, we conducted two separate
one-way ANOVAs on each causal frame (periphrastic and
conjunction) with agent type as the within-subjects factor.
These analyses revealed no signiﬁcant main effects of
agent type for either syntactic frame (periphrastic frame:
F(2, 30) < 1; conjunction frame: F(2, 30) < 1). Thus, children
were equally likely to map non-causal verbs into the periphrastic or conjunction syntactic frame for the intended,
unintended, and object events.

2.5.2. Non-causal effect verbs
Fig. 1 (Panel B) displays the percentage of non-causal effect verbs (‘‘fall’’) as a function of agent type (intended,
unintended, and object) and effect type (motion or state
change). To assess the inﬂuence of agent type and effect

2.5.3. Non-causal other verbs
Fig. 1 (Panel C) displays the percentage of non-causal
other verbs (‘‘hit’’) as a function of agent type (intended,

Fig. 2. Percentage of causal verbs (e.g., ‘‘break’’) mapped into causal
syntactic frames (lexical, periphrastic, conjunction) as a function of the
type of agent (intended, unintended, object). The percentages were
calculated by dividing the number of causal verbs mapped into causal
syntactic frames for each child by the number of causal verbs each child
produced, and then averaging across children. Error bars depict ±1 SE of
the mean.

Fig. 3. Percentage of non-causal effect verbs (e.g., ‘‘fall’’) mapped into
causal syntactic frames (lexical, periphrastic, conjunction) as a function of
the type of agent (intended, unintended, object). The percentages were
calculated by dividing the number of non-causal verbs mapped into
causal syntactic frames for each child by the number of non-causal verbs
each child produced, and then averaging across children. Error bars depict
±1 SE of the mean.
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unintended, and object) and effect type (motion or state
change). To assess the inﬂuence of agent type and effect
type on children’s choice of non-causal other verbs, a 3
(Agent type)  2 (Effect type) within-subjects ANOVA
was conducted on the percentage of non-causal other
verbs chosen; this yielded a signiﬁcant main effect of agent
type, F(2, 30) = 7.67, p < .01. Planned analyses, using Tukey’s HSD with p set at .05, revealed that children chose
more non-causal other verbs for the unintended events
(M = 34.1%) and the object events (M = 29.9%) than the intended events (M = 13%) (p < .05). There was no main effect
of effect type, F(1, 15) = 2.2, p > .05. Children did not choose
more non-causal other verbs for the motion events
(M = 22.2%) than the state change events (M = 29.2%). Finally there was a signiﬁcant interaction between the two
factors, F(2, 30) = 4.5, p < .05. This interaction was due to
the fact that children chose more non-causal other verbs
for the unintended motion events than the unintended
state change events, and that this pattern reversed for
the intended events and object events. Since these verbs
could not be mapped into causal linguistic structures that
described the relevant causal structure of the intended,
unintended, and object events, the type of syntactic structures that these verbs were mapped into was not analyzed.
2.6. Discussion
These results show that, when describing a causal
event, children were more likely to use causal language
to describe intentionally caused events than to describe
either unintentionally caused events or object-caused
events. This bias showed up strongly both in the verbs that
the children chose to describe the events (children chose
more causal verbs (‘‘break’’) for the intentionally caused
events than the unintentionally- and the object-caused
events) as well as in the syntactic frames these verbs were
mapped into (children mapped verbs into lexical syntactic
frames, such as ‘‘she broke the tower’’, more for the intentionally caused events than the unintentionally- and the
object-caused events). Further, children used more noncausal other verbs (‘‘she hit the ball’’) to describe the unintended and object-caused events than the intentionally
caused events. Children’s use of causal language, however,
did not differ by the type of effect (motion or state change).
Thus, children have an intention-to-CAUSE bias – children are more likely to encode intentionally caused events
with causal language than unintentionally caused or object-caused events, and this pattern holds for both motion
and stage change events. This ﬁnding is consistent with the
hypothesis that in infancy causal representations have
their basis in events involving intentional agents, which
then leads to biases in children’s conceptual representations and the mapping of these representations into
language (Piaget, 1954; White, 1995, 1999). The pattern
of ﬁndings in the current study also extends the pattern
observed in Wolff (2003) and Song and Wolff (2005) with
adults to 3- to 4-year-old children. The adults in these
studies differentiated among intentionally caused, unintentionally caused, and object-caused events; speciﬁcally,
they described all these events with causal verbs, although
lexical causative frames were preferred more for intention-

ally caused events than unintentionally caused and objectcaused events. Similarly, the children in the current study
also differentiated among intentionally caused, unintentionally caused, and object-caused events; however, the
children in the current study showed a bias to describe
the intentional events with causal verbs. Thus, whereas
the differentiation for adults in Wolff and colleagues’ studies is at the level of syntactic structure, the differentiation
for children in the current study appears to be the level of
verb choice and the likelihood of using causal language at
all to encode the events.
In Experiment 2, we continue to explore the intentionto-CAUSE bias in children’s causal language with a
language judgment task. If children have a bias to map
intentionally caused events into causal language, then they
should prefer causal language over non-causal language to
describe those events. In this experiment, we present children with the intended, unintended, and/or object events
from Experiment 1 and ask them to choose between a
causative description (e.g., ‘‘she made the balloon pop’’)
and a non-causal description (e.g., ‘‘she touched the balloon with her pen’’). Importantly, the periphrastic causative
construction was the causal language option for all three
event types: intended, unintended and object.
We chose the periphrastic causative construction as the
causal language option for two reasons. First, it is possible
that in Experiment 1 children did not describe the unintentionally caused and object-caused events with causal language simply because the periphrastic causative structure
(e.g., ‘‘he made the balloon pop’’), the structure that adults
chose in Wolff (2003), was too difﬁcult to produce, which
in turn led to the children to produce simpler non-causal
structures (‘‘the balloon popped’’). If this was the case, then
when provided with this description in Experiment 2, children should prefer the periphrastic causative description
over the non-causal description for the unintended and object events. Second, using the periphrastic causative
description provides a more robust test of the intentionto-CAUSE bias. If robust, then even when provided with a
less preferred causal description for adults (i.e., intentional
causal event ? periphrastic causative construction), children should still prefer this description more for the intentionally caused events than the unintentionally- and
object-caused events.
3. Experiment 2
3.1. Participants
Twenty-ﬁve 3.5- to 4-year-old children (M = 45 months,
3 days, range = 42 months, 21 days to 47 months, 16 days)
participated in Experiment 1 (14 females). Three additional
children were excluded because they failed to pass 3 of the
4 training trials (see below).
3.2. Stimuli
Participants viewed 16 videotaped events on a laptop
computer. These were drawn from the same set of events
as used in Experiment 1. Children viewed 16 events: eight
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target events and eight control events. For the target
events, one group of children (n = 12) viewed four intended
events and four unintended events (Condition 1) and a second group of children (n = 13) viewed four intended events
and four object events (Condition 2). The eight control
events depicted transfer events (giving/receiving) and motion events involving a single person (i.e., a girl jumping off
of a bench).
For each set of target events (intended, unintended, object), one puppet described the event using a periphrastic
causative (‘‘she made the block tower break’’) and another
puppet described the event using a non-causal description
(‘‘she dropped the block’’).
For the periphrastic causative descriptions of each
event, we provided children with the most frequent causal
verb that was used by the children to describe that event in
Experiment 1. The periphrastic causative descriptions all
had the following structure: noun/agent made embedded
VP/effect; e.g., ‘‘X made the tower break.’’ The non-causal
descriptions all had the following structure: NP/agent VP/
action DO/patient; e.g., ‘‘she dropped the block’’. These
descriptions always described the action of the agent in
the causal event and were true descriptions of the event.
A full list of the descriptions used is available in Table 2.
For the eight control events, half of the events were described with a completely true statement and half were
described with a completely false statement. For example,
for the control event in which one girl gave another girl
some balloons, the true statement would be, ‘‘the girl gave
the other girl some balloons,’’ and the false statement
would be, ‘‘the girls at some cake.’’ Children’s performance
on the control events provided an upper limit on their
accuracy with this type of task.

3.3. Procedure
In order to felicitously elicit children’s judgments of linguistic descriptions, we concocted a situation where the
child would be the teacher and his or her job would be
to teach two stuffed animals how to talk. Children were
introduced to a frog and a rabbit, and the experimenter explained to the child, ‘‘these animals are learning how to
talk about the movies and your job is to teach them how
to tell good stories about the movies. We will watch a video on my computer, then each animal will tell you a story
about the movie. Sometimes the frog will tell a better
story, and sometimes the rabbit will tell a better story.
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Your job is to point to the puppet who told the better story.
’’ The experimenter stressed the importance of being a
good teacher so the animals could learn how to talk.
After viewing each video, one puppet described the video with a periphrastic causative (‘‘The boy/The ball made
the tv turn off’’) and the other puppet described the video
with a non-causal action statement (‘‘The boy/The ball
touched the remote’’). For the control videos, one puppet
described the video with a true statement and the other
puppet described the video with a false statement. For
example, following a video in which a girl jumped off of
a bench, one puppet said ‘‘the girl jumped off the bench’’
(true statement), and the other puppet said ‘‘the girl ran
away’’ (false statement). To counteract any potential perseverative response bias, half of the ﬁller trials were participant controlled, such that the puppet that spoke the true
statement was the puppet not chosen on the previous trial.
Before the experiment began, participants received four
training trials: a girl waving, a boy giving a girl a bat, a girl
falling off of a chair, and a leaf moving from a shoe into a
hat. For the training trials one puppet described the event
with a true statement (e.g., ‘‘The girl waved’’) and the other
puppet described the event with a false statement (e.g.,
‘‘The girl clapped her hands’’). If the child did not answer
the training trial correctly (choose the puppet that described the true statement), then he or she was retrained
on that speciﬁc video. Any child who did not correctly answer at least 3 of the 4 training trails without retraining
was excluded from the ﬁnal analysis (n = 3).

3.4. Results
Children’s responses for the control videos were ﬁrst
scored for correctness (i.e., choosing the puppet who produced the ‘true’ statement about the video). Collapsing
across the two conditions, children chose the correct
descriptions at well above chance response levels, which
was 50% (M = 84.9%; one-sample t-test, t(24) = 14.45,
p < .001), suggesting that children were successful at performing this task.
The next analyses explored how often children in the
two conditions pointed to the puppet who produced the
periphrastic causative (rather than the non-causal statement) for the different event types (intended, unintended,
object). As shown in Fig. 4, in the intended vs. unintended
condition, children chose the causative description signiﬁcantly more often for the intended (M = 66.7%) than the

Table 2
Causal and non-causal descriptions used in Experiment 2. For each description, the ﬁrst agent listed was used to describe the intended and unintended events,
and the second agent was used to describe the object events.
Event

Effect type

Causal description

Non-causal description

Ball
Cup
Food
Train
Balloon
Block
Lump
Television

Motion
Motion
Motion
Motion
State change
State change
State change
State change

The
The
The
The
The
The
The
The

The
The
The
The
The
The
The
The

boy/baseball ball made the beach ball move
girl/boy made the cup fall off the table
boy/’books made the chips spill
girl/ball made the train move
girl/ball made the balloon pap
girl/ball made the tower break
girl/ball made th lamp turn off
boy/ball made the tv turn off

boy lifted the shirt/The baseball ball touched the red ball
girl moved the spoon/The ball touched the bottle
boy turned over the cup/The books touched the cup
girl/ball touched the button
girl moved the pen/The ball hit the cup
girl threw/dropped the block/The ball touched the bottle
girl/ball touched the switch on the wall
boy sat on the remote/The ball touched the remote
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Fig. 4. Children’s preference for the periphrastic causal description as a function of the type of agent (Condition 1: intended vs. unintended; condition 2:
intended vs. object). Chance performance across both tasks is 50% (dotted line). Error bars depict ±1 SE of the mean.

unintended events (M = 50%), paired t-test, t(11) = 2.60,
p < .05. Further, for the intended events, children chose
the periphrastic causative description signiﬁcantly above
chance, one-sample t-test, t(11) = 2.52, p < .05; this was
not the case for the unintended events. Further inspection
of the data for all conditions in this experiment revealed
that that children’s responses for the unintended (and
object events described below) were not the result of a
bimodal distribution in which half of the children showed
a preference for the periphrastic causative description and
half of the children showed a preference for the non-causal
action description.
The same pattern was found for children in the intended/object condition. As shown in Fig. 4, children chose
the periphrastic causative description signiﬁcantly more
often for the intended (M = 71.2%) than the object events
(M = 46.2%), paired t-test, t(12) = .36, p < .05. Further, for
the intended events, children chose the periphrastic causative description signiﬁcantly above chance, one-sample
t-test, t(12) = 3.395, p < .01; this was not the case for the
object events, t(12) = .485, p > .05. Thus, children preferred causal language for the intended events and had
no preference for the object events.
3.5. Discussion
The results from Experiment 2 suggest that the intention-to-CAUSE bias in 3.5- to 4-year-old children is robust.
When children viewed intentionally caused, unintentionally caused, and object-caused events and were provided
with causal and non-causal statements, they had a greater
preference for causal language to describe intentionally
caused events than to describe unintentionally caused or
object-caused events. This was so even though the causal
language that they accepted was the periphrastic construction – a construction that children virtually never spontaneously produced in Experiment 1, and a construction
that adults do not prefer for intentionally caused mediated
events. Thus, Experiment 2 provides strong evidence for
the intention-to-CAUSE bias.
In the remainder of the paper, we begin to explore more
deeply the nature of the intention-to-CAUSE bias in chil-

dren. One explanation for this bias is that children do not
represent the cause in unintentionally caused and objectcaused events, thus making it highly unlikely that these
non-causal conceptual representations would ever be
mapped into causal linguistic structures. This explanation
is ruled out, however, by the results of Experiments 1 and
2. Children produced and chose some causal descriptions
for the unintended/object events (i.e., the percentage of
children producing/choosing causal language for the unintended and object events was not zero), suggesting that
children have the competence to perform a causal analysis
for unintentionally caused and object-caused events.
A second explanation is that although children were
able to represent the cause for all of the events, they are
much more likely to encode intentionally caused events
causally than to encode unintentionally caused and object-caused events causally. This is then reﬂected by
language; children use causal language more for intentionally caused events than unintentionally caused and objectcaused events. Finally, a third explanation is that children
are equally able to represent the cause in all three event
types, yet when they map conceptual representations of
the causal events into linguistic structure, they are more
likely to map both the cause and effect into language for
intentionally caused events than for unintentionally caused
and object-caused events. Unlike the former explanation,
this latter explanation puts the bias in the mapping of
events into linguistic structure, rather than in formation
of conceptual representations per se. This mapping bias
may emerge because the perspective that children take
on the intentionally caused events (e.g., cause + effect) differs from the perspective they take on the unintentionally
caused and object-caused events (e.g., action only or effect
only).
Experiment 3 aimed to tease apart these two latter possibilities (unequal likelihood to perform a causal analysis
vs. unequal mappings of conceptual representations of
causal events into causal language) using a counterfactual
reasoning task. In this task, children viewed an event (e.g.,
a girl accidentally drops an object on a tower, causing it to
break) and were asked to predict what the end state of the
patient object would be if the potential agent (intended,
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unintended, object) had not performed a given action (e.g.,
tower intact or tower broken?). If children represent the
event as causal, then there is only one correct answer – if
the agent did not perform the action, then the effect should
not have occurred. Thus, unlike the language tasks in
Experiments 1 and 2, which provided children with options about how the event could be encoded (e.g., ‘‘the
man made the tower break’’, ‘‘the tower broke’’, etc.), a
counterfactual reasoning task directly tests whether children are equally able to compute the causal relation between the agent and the effect in an event across the
event types of these studies.
If the intention-to-CAUSE bias emerges because children are more likely to represent intentional events as causal, then children should be better at counterfactually
reasoning about the intentionally caused events than the
unintentionally caused and object-caused events. In contrast, if the intention-to-CAUSE bias emerges when children map conceptual representations of causal events
into language, then children should be able to counterfactually reason equally well for all events.
4. Experiment 3
4.1. Participants
Fourteen 3.5- to 4-year-old children (M = 44 months,
15 days, range = 42 months, 22 days to 45 months, 4 days)
participated in Experiment 2 (six females). Two additional
participants were excluded because they were unable to
complete the experiment.
4.2. Stimuli
Participants viewed 24 videotaped events on a laptop
computer. These 24 events were the same events as Experiments 1 (eight Intended, eight Unintended, and eight Object events). Eight pairs of photographs were also created
depicting the starting state and end state of each patient
object (e.g., TV on/TV off, Tower standing up/tower broken
in pieces, balloon whole/balloon popped, etc.).
4.3. Procedure
Participants were told they would watch a series of
short videos on the laptop computer. After each video the
experimenter asked the participant a counterfactual question about the agent, mediator, and patient (‘‘If < the
agent > had not < acted on the mediator>, what would
the < patient > look like?). The participant responded by
pointing to one of two pictures that were presented after
each movie had ended and the screen had become black.
One picture depicted the beginning state of the patient
object, and the other picture depicted the end state of
the patient object. For example, for the intended causal
event in which the boy turns off the television by touching
the remote, the experimenter asked the participant, ‘‘If the
boy did not touch the remote, what would the tv look
like?’’ The child then responded by pointing to either the
‘TV on’ picture (correct) or the ‘TV off’ picture (incorrect).
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The counterfactual questions for the unintended causal
events were identical to the counterfactual questions for
the intended causal events. The counterfactual questions
for the object causal events differed in that ‘‘ball’’ was
substituted in the subject position of the sentence (e.g.,
‘‘If the ball did not touch the remote, what would the tv
look like?’’).
In addition to the counterfactual questions, we asked
two additional questions to ensure that children had accurate representations of the sequence of events in the video
as well as to control for any possible picture bias within
each pair of photographs. Children were asked a Beginning
question and an End question about the patient object. In
the Beginning question, children were asked, ‘‘What did
the <patient> look like at the beginning of the movie?’’ In
the End question, children were asked, ‘‘What did the <patient> look like at the end of the movie?’’ The order of the
control questions (beginning/end) was randomized and
then the order of presentation (before vs. after the counterfactual reasoning task) was counterbalanced; this eliminated the possibility that children would adopt a pattern
a responding such as, choose ‘TV on’ picture, then ‘TV off’
picture, then ‘TV on’ picture).
4.4. Results
Children were equally as accurate in answering the control questions (Beginning and End) for all three conditions,
as conﬁrmed by a 3 (agent: Intended, Unintended,
Object)  2 (question: Beginning, End) within-subjects ANOVA, which yielded no main effect of Agent, F(2, 26) =
1.563, p > .05, no main effect of question, F(1, 13) = .164,
p > .05, and no interaction between the two factors,
F(2, 26) = .166, p > .05. One sample t-tests on children’s performance for the questions (beginning, end) on the intended (M = 74.7%, M = 75.8%), unintended (M = 79.9%,
M = 79.3%), and object events (M = 70.4%, M = 71.3%) conﬁrmed that their performance was above chance (50%) for
each event type (p < .05 for each event type). Since accurate
responding to the counterfactual questions depended upon
an accurate representation of the beginning and end state
of the patient object, however, the trials in which the child
did not answer both of the control questions correctly were
subsequently excluded from further analysis.
As shown in Fig. 5, children were quite accurate in
answering the counterfactual reasoning questions for all
the event types. One sample t-tests revealed that children
responded above chance for the intended (M = 80.0%),
t(13) = 4.269, p < .01, unintended (M = 80.4%), t(13) =
5.123, p < .001, and object (M = 72.8%) events, t(13) =
3.879, p < .01. Furthermore, children’s accuracy on the
counterfactual questions did not differ by the type of
agent; a within-subjects ANOVA on the percentage of correct responses for each agent type (Intended, Unintended,
Object) revealed no main effect of agent, F(2, 26) = 1.58,
p > .05.
4.5. Discussion
These results suggest that children were equally likely to
represent the intended, unintended, and object events as
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Fig. 5. Children’s accuracy in the counterfactual reasoning task as a
function of the type of agent (intended, unintended, object). Chance
responding is 50% (dotted line). Error bars depict ±1 SE of the mean.

causal. For all three agent types, children correctly reasoned
about what the state of the patient would be if the causal
agent had not performed a causal action. These ﬁndings
suggest that the intention-to-CAUSE bias observed for children in Experiments 1 and 2 emerged when children
mapped their conceptual representations of the causal
events into language. Although children were equally likely
to represent the intended, unintended, and object events as
causal, children adopted different perspectives on these
conceptual representations, as illustrated by their linguistic
encoding of the events in Experiments 1 and 2. Children
mapped both the cause and the effect into linguistic structure when the effect was caused by an intentional actor,
but not when the effect was caused by an unintentional
actor or object.

5. General discussion
This paper investigated whether there are biases in the
way children map causal events into causal language. We
presented 3.5- to 4-year-old children with causal events
that varied in the type of agent (human acting intentionally or unintentionally, or inanimate object) and the type
of effect (motion or state change) and examined how children mapped these events into language. Across two
experiments we found evidence that the type of agent,
but not the type of effect, inﬂuenced children’s causal language. In Experiment 1 (elicited production task), children
used causal language (i.e., causal verbs, causal syntactic
frames) more to describe events that were caused by a human acting intentionally than to describe events that were
caused by a human acting unintentionally or by an object.
In Experiment 2 (language judgment task), children preferred causal language (periphrastic causative construction) to describe the intentionally caused events; they
did not show such a preference for unintentionally caused
and object-caused events. These ﬁndings suggest that children show an intention-to-CAUSE bias.
Children’s intention-to-CAUSE bias is likely a bias in the
perspective they adopt on events – a bias that then shows
up as children map conceptual representations of cause

into language. We regard this bias as akin to other examples in language in which representations of an event can
be mapped into language in multiple ways. For example,
consider a transfer of possession event. When one views
a ball pass from a girl to a boy, he or she may represent
all the essential components of the transfer (the ball, the
passing, the girl, and the boy), and may adopt one of several perspectives; for example, one may construe the event
as the girl giving the ball to the boy or as the boy receiving
the ball from the girl. One’s perspective on the event will
then inﬂuence his or her choice of verb. One may describe
this event with the verb ‘give,’ which maps the giver in the
subject position and the goal in the PP (‘‘the girl gave the
ball to the boy’’), or with the verb ‘receive,’ which maps
the recipient in the subject position and the source, optionally, in the PP (‘‘the boy received the ball from the girl’’). Indeed, research has shown that children and adults (Fisher,
Gleitman, & Gleitman, 1991; Lakusta & Landau, 2005), and
perhaps even infants (Cohen & Oakes, 1993) tend to adopt
an agent/goal-biased perspective in such events.
A similar explanation may account for the intention-toCAUSE bias. As suggested by the results from the counterfactual reasoning task (Experiment 3), although children
can represent all the essential components of the causal
interaction (the action, the effect, the causal relation between them) for the intended, unintended, and objectcaused events, they may have been more likely to adopt
a perspective on the event that included all of these components for the intentionally caused events than for the
unintentionally caused and object-caused events. Children’s perspective of the event then inﬂuenced their choice
of verb. For the intentionally caused events, children were
more likely to use verbs like ‘break’ and, when they used
such verbs, were more likely to map both the cause and
effect into syntactic structures. In contrast, for the unintentionally caused and object-caused events, children’s
perspective led to a verb choice such as ‘hit’ or ‘fall,’ and
they were more likely to map only the action or the effect,
but not the causal relation between the two, into syntactic
structure. Thus, the nature of the agent in the event (human acting intentionally vs. human acting unintentionally
and object acting) seems to inﬂuence the perspective
children have of an event, leading children to show an
intention-to-CAUSE bias in mapping conceptual representations of causal events into linguistic structure.
The intention-to-CAUSE bias may stem from conceptual
biases earlier in development. Recent ﬁndings on infants’
and toddlers’ causal representations are consistent with
this hypothesis. Upon viewing a novel state change event,
infants attribute the cause of the event to a dispositional
causal agent, such as a human hand, and not to a typically
inert object, such as a toy train (Muentener & Carey, 2010).
Moreover, the type of action that a person performs also
inﬂuences infants’ causal attributions. Infants only attribute the cause of novel state change events to a hand
engaging in deliberate, goal-directed action, but not to a
hand that ﬂops down in an accidental manner (Muentener
& Carey, 2008). A similar pattern has also been shown in
toddlers’ spontaneous construal of causal events. Toddlers
are more likely to represent a mediated predictive event
(i.e., block A contacts block B, and then a toy airplane
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activates) as a causal event when it presented in an agentive context (e.g., the experimenter moves block A) than a
non-agentive context (e.g., block A moves spontaneously)
(Bonawitz et al., 2010). Thus, it is these conceptual biases
that may result in the intention-to-CAUSE bias observed
in the current experiment. Further research is needed to
link studies on prelinguistic infants’ and toddlers’ conceptual representations of causality with children’s linguistic
representations of causality.
In conclusion, the current study suggests that 3.5- to 4year-old children have a bias to map intentionally caused
events into causal language more often than unintentionally caused or object-caused events. These ﬁndings have
implications for our understanding the nature of children’s
conceptual representations of causal events, how these
representations are mapped into linguistic structures,
and also may shed new light on the age-old question of
the origin of causal representations. These results open a
new avenue of research exploring the precise nature of
an intention-to-CAUSE bias in children, and lend support
to the idea that causal representations may be closely
linked to representations of intentional action early in
development.
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Appendix A
Descriptions of the Intended, Unintended, and Object
events.
A.1. Ball events
Intended event: A ball is resting on a cloth t-shirt. A
man is kneeling next to the t-shirt. He lifts the edge of
the t-shirt and the ball rolls off of the t-shirt.
Unintended event: A ball is resting on a cloth t-shirt. A
man is sitting next to a t-shirt, facing away from the shirt.
He fans his face, as if he is warm, picks up the t-shirt without looking at it, and wipes his face with the t-shirt. As he
lifts the t-shirt, the ball rolls off of the t-shirt.
Object event: Two balls are resting on the ﬂoor, clearly
separated in distance. A baseball rolls on screen, contacts
the ﬁrst ball, which then rolls and contacts the second ball.
The second ball rolls.
A.2. Cup event
Intended event: A cup is resting on a table. A woman is
sitting at the table reading and eating from a bowl with a
spoon. She appears to get angry, slams the paper down
and uses the spoon to hit the cup. The cup falls off the
table.
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Unintended event: A cup is resting on a table. A woman
is sitting at the table reading and eating from a bowl with a
spoon. She is twirling her spoon and not looking at the cup.
As she twirls her spoon, the spoon hits the cup. The cup
falls off the table.
Object event: A cup is resting on a table. A bottle is resting next to the cup, but not in contact with the cup. A ball
ﬂies in from off screen, contacts the bottle, which falls over
and rolls into the cup. The cup then falls off the table.
A.3. Food event
Intended event: A man walks in from off screen, with a
cup of food in his hand. He walks towards a garbage can
and turns over the cup. The food from the cup falls into
the garbage can.
Unintended event: A man walks in from off screen with
a cup of food in his hand. He appears to trip, falling towards a garbage can. As he falls towards the garbage can,
he turns the cup over towards the garbage can. The food
from the cup falls into the garbage can. The man appears
frustrated that the food is in the garbage.
Object event: A cup of food is resting on a surface next
to a stack of upright books. The books spontaneously fall
over towards the cup of food. The cup of food then tips over
in the direction of a garbage can. The food from the cup
falls into the garbage can.
A.4. Train event
Intended event: A toy train is at rest on a table behind a
plexiglass screen. A green lever is in front of the screen. A
woman walks in, sits down at a chair in front of the lever
and presses the lever, looking at the toy train. The toy train
then moves partway around a train track.
Unintended event: A toy train is at rest on a table behind a plexiglass screen. A green lever is in front of the
screen. A woman walks in, sits down at a chair in front of
the lever and rests her elbow on the lever, looking away
from the toy train. The toy train then moves partway
around a train track. The woman appears surprised.
Object event: A toy train is at rest on a table behind a
plexiglass screen. A green lever is in front of the screen. A
ball ﬂies in from off screen, landing on the green lever.
The toy train then moves partway around a train track.
A.5. Balloon events
Intended event: A balloon is resting on a couch. A woman is sitting on the couch next to the balloon, writing
on a piece of paper with a pen. She appears to get frustrated, turns towards the balloon, looks at it, and uses
the pen to tap the balloon. The balloon pops.
Unintended event: A balloon is resting on a couch. A
woman is sitting on the couch next to the balloon, writing
on a piece of paper with a pen. She stretches her arms,
moving her pen towards the balloon without looking at
it. The pen comes in contact with the balloon. The balloon
pops.
Object event: A balloon is resting on a couch. A cup of
pens is resting on the top of the couch. A ball ﬂies in from
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off screen, contacting the cup. The cup falls over and lands
on the balloon. The balloon pops.
A.6. Block events
Intended event: A block tower is resting on a table. A
woman walks in with another block. She looks at the block
tower and throws the block at the block tower. The block
tower breaks apart.
Unintended event: A block tower is resting on a table. A
woman walks in with another block, twirling it around in
her hand. As she walks by the block tower, she drops the
block on the block tower. The block tower breaks apart.
Object event: A block tower is resting on a table. A bottle is resting next to the block tower. A ball ﬂies in from off
screen and contacts the bottle. The bottle tips over and
contacts the block tower. The block tower breaks apart.
A.7. Lamp events
Intended event: A lamp is resting on a table. A woman
enters the room and presses the light switch on the wall.
The lamp turns off.
Unintended event: A lamp is resting on a table. A woman enters the room and leans against the light switch
on the wall, without looking at the lamp or the switch.
The lamp turns off.
Object event: A lamp is resting on a table. A ball ﬂies in
from off screen and contacts the light switch on the wall.
The lamp turns off.
A.8. Television events
Intended event: A television playing a video. A remote
control is resting on a chair in front of the television. The
man walks in from off screen, picks up the remote control,
sits in the chair, points the remote control at the television,
and pushes a button on the remote control. The television
turns off.
Unintended event: A television playing a video. A remote control is resting on a chair in front of the television.
The man walks in from off screen and sits on the chair (and
the remote control). The television turns off. The man appears surprised.
Object event: A television playing a video. A remote
control is resting on a chair in front of the television. A ball
ﬂies in from off screen and lands on the remote control.
The television turns off.
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